South Carolina Law Review
Volume 63
Issue 4 ANNUAL SURVEY OF SOUTH CAROLINA
LAW

Article 9

Summer 2012

State Immunity from Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Inverse
Condemnation as an Alternative Remedy
Wesley D. Greenwell

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Greenwell, Wesley D. (2012) "State Immunity from Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Inverse Condemnation
as an Alternative Remedy," South Carolina Law Review: Vol. 63 : Iss. 4 , Article 9.
Available at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol63/iss4/9

This Article is brought to you by the Law Reviews and Journals at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in South Carolina Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

Greenwell: State Immunity from Patent Infringement Lawsuits: Inverse Condemn

STATE IMMUNITY FROM PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS:
INVERSE CONDEMNATION AS AN ALTERNATIVE REMEDY

I.

INTRODUCTION .................................................................
975

11.

STATE UNIVERSITY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM PATENT

INFRINGEMENT LAWSUITS ........................................................
977

A.
B.
C.
D.

CongressionalAttempts to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity ...................
979
State Waiver of Sovereign Immunity .........................................
980
983
A Limited Exception to Immunity: The Ex parte Young Doctrine .......
The Scope of the Problem and the Need for a Solution........................
984

III. RECOURSE IN THE STATE COURTS .............................................
986

A. Trespass to Chattels or Conversion .........................................
987
B. Unjust Enrichment .....................................................
988
C. Unfair Competition or Interference with Prospective
ContractualRelations ..................................................
990

IV . THE TAKINGS CLAUSE .....................................................
990
A. Scope of Private PropertyProtectedUnder the Fifth
A m endment ..........................................................
992
B. What Constitutes a "Taking " for the Purposes of the Fifth
A m endment? .........................................................
992
1. Economic Impact of Taking............................................
994
2. Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations.......................
995
3. Characterof GovernmentalAction ......................................
996
C. What Constitutes a "Public Use"? ..........................................
997
D. Advantages of the Inverse Condemnation Approach ...........................
998

V . C ONCLUSION ............................................................
999

I.

INTRODUCTION

Under the constitutional authority to "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts,"' Congress enacted patent laws that provide for a quid pro quo
exchange-inventors fully disclose their inventions in exchange for limited
monopoly rights in those inventions. 2 Those rights are aimed at incentivizing
creation and promoting the disclosure of inventions to the public so that the

1. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl.8.
2.
See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 216 (2003) (citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel
Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229 (1964)).
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inventions may be used as building blocks for future innovation.3 The most
fundamental right provided in this exchange is the right to exclude others from
using the invention.4 However, due to a constitutional anomaly, state
universities may use patented inventions without fear of reprimand because the
Eleventh Amendment 5provides state universities with immunity from patent
infringement lawsuits.
That unauthorized use directly violates the patent
owner's right to exclude, resulting in less effective protection than was
contemplated by Congress in the quid pro quo exchange.
The inequity that is apparent in the foregoing is compounded by state
universities' extensive use of patent laws for their own benefit. State universities
benefit from patent laws, not only by obtaining and enforcing patents, but also
through aggressive licensing efforts that generate millions upon millions of
dollars in revenue each year.6 As state universities increase their use of federal
patent laws to protect and profit from their inventive and researching efforts,
there has been increased concern about the fact that state universities may use the
patent laws for their benefit, but are not bound by the laws themselves.7
In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College
Savings Bank,8 the Supreme Court rejected a congressional attempt to abrogate
state sovereign immunity and restore the balance set out in the patent laws.9 The
Court made clear that a state university can be sued for patent infringement only
0
if Congress properly abrogates immunity, or if the state itself consents to suit.'
As an alternative to a patent infringement lawsuit, a patent owner may seek a
limited remedy in federal court by suing a state official under the doctrine
expounded in Ex parte Young. I" However, under that doctrine, injured plaintiffs
face a virtually unreachable burden of proof and even in a successful case are
limited to injunctive relief. 12 Since patent law falls exclusively within federal

3.
Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480-81 (1974)).
4. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (citing
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979)); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 859 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
5. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (governing state sovereign immunity).
6. See Tejas N. Narechania, Note, An Offensive Weapon?: An Empirical Analysis of the
"Sword" of State Sovereign Immunity in State-Owned Patents, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1574, 1612
(2010); Elizabeth A. Rowe, The Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement: Do
Universities Deserve Special Treatment?, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 921, 924 (2006) ("[Universities] gain
billions of dollars in revenues annually from patent licenses and royalties.").
7.

U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-811,

INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: STATE

IMMUNITY IN INFRINGEMENT ACTIONS 6 (2001) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
8.
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
9.
See id. at 647-48.
10. Id. at 634, 637 (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 59 (1996)).
11. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
12. See Abhay Watwe, Note, Ex Parte Young Remedy for State Infringement of Intellectual
Property, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 793, 795 (2008) (citing Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68
(1985)).
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jurisdiction, 13 and because the remedies available against state universities in
federal court are often insufficient, injured patent owners have tried to recover
under various innovative theories in state court.14 However, those attempts have
been largely unsuccessful due to the doctrine of federal preemption, state

immunity in its own tribunals, and the lack of appropriate state causes of
action. 15
Another alternative to a patent infringement lawsuit against a state university
by the patent owner is an inverse condemnation action, which is based on the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and may be brought in state or federal
court. r6 In an inverse condemnation action, the patent owner would allege that
the university has "taken" an intangible property right-the patent owner's right
to exclude-thus entitling the patent owner to just compensation under the Fifth
Amendment. 17
Part II of this Note discusses state university sovereign immunity from
patent infringement lawsuits and describes the current state of that doctrine in the
federal court system. Part I focuses on the availability of alternative remedies
for injured patent owners in state courts, and discusses several proposed state
causes of action and their likelihood of success. Part IV of this Note discusses
the Fifth Amendment and the possibility of a claim for inverse condemnation
brought by a patent owner for alleged patent infringement by a state university.
Part IV also suggests that inverse condemnation lawsuits would best promote the
goals of federalism and the federal patent system, while simultaneously
protecting the interests of patent owners.
II.

STATE UNIVERSITY SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY FROM PATENT INFRINGEMENT
LAWSUITS

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution provides the
states with sovereign immunity from causes of action arising under federal
laws. 8 The Eleventh Amendment did not create this immunity; instead, the

amendment is merely an affirmation of preexisting concepts of federalism and

13. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
14. See, e.g., GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 19-20 (noting that a plaintiff may seek to
recover by employing legal theories such as reverse eminent domain, unfair competition,
conversion, and trespass to chattel).
15. See id. at 23-24.
16. See Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Condemning Religion: RLUIPA and the Politics
of Eminent Domain, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1, 47 (2009). However, "federal ripeness doctrines
require property owners to pursue inverse condemnation or its equivalent in state court before
bringing a federal constitutional claim." Id. (citing Williamson Cnty. Reg'l Planning Comm'n v.
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985)).
17. See id.
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XI ("The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.").
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limited government that are inherent in the Constitution. 19 Upon joining the
Union, states did not forfeit their sovereign status, and, therefore, retained their
immunity from private lawsuits. 20 The purpose of the immunity was to prevent
states, as sovereign entities, from being subjected to the indignity of a lawsuit by
private individuals.2'
The scope of state immunity includes not only actions where the state is a
named defendant, but also certain actions against state agents and
instrumentalities. 22 In general, state entities may invoke the protections of
sovereign immunity in any case in which the potential recovery might be paid
from the state treasury, 23 or where the lawsuit would offend the dignity of the
sovereign state. 24 The Eleventh Amendment provides state universities, as arms
of the state, with sovereign immunity from suit under federal law by virtue of
their relationship to the state sovereign. 25
Patent law falls exclusively within federal jurisdiction. 26 Therefore, if patent
owners wish to enforce the rights granted to them by federal patent laws, their
only recourse is the federal court system.27
In general, the Eleventh Amendment and federal patent law operate in their
own domains, without overlap or conflict. However, when a state university
uses a patented invention without the patent owner's authorization, the patent
owner is in a predicament; the unauthorized use is a violation of the patent
owner's right to exclude under federal patent law, however, the patent owner
cannot sue the university for patent infringement because the university has
Eleventh Amendment immunity. Thus, the university can infringe patents with
impunity, completely without fear of reprimand. This unauthorized use directly
violates the patent owner's right to exclude, resulting in an imbalance of
incentives in the invention and patent process. As mentioned, this inequity that

19. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 728-29 (1999).
20. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 752 (2002).
21. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
22. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 519 U.S. 425, 429 (1997) (citing Ford Motor Co. v.
Dep't of Treasury of Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945), overruled by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613 (2002); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 438-39 (1900); Ayers, 123
U.S. at 487; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 287 (1885)).
23. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48-49 (1994) (compiling cases
that held that the implication of the state treasury is the most important factor in determining
whether Eleventh Amendment immunity applies).
24. See Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 760.
25. See, e.g., Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 575 (10th Cir. 1996) ("Our
cases have consistently found state universities are arms of the state."); Martin v. Clemson Univ.,
654 F. Supp. 2d 410, 425 (D.S.C. 2009) (holding that Clemson University "is an arm of the state"
and thus was entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).
26. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil
action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trademarks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent, plant variety
protection and copyright cases.").
27. See id.
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is apparent in the foregoing situation is compounded
by state universities'
28
extensive use of patent laws for their own benefit.
In order to hold state universities accountable for patent infringement in the
federal court system, Congress has attempted to abrogate state immunity,29 and

plaintiffs have argued that universities' consent to suit through express or
constructive waiver of their immunity. However, as discussed below, thus far
the available federal
remedies provide inadequate protection for the rights of
30
patent owners.
A.

CongressionalAttempts to Abrogate Sovereign Immunity

In 1990, the Federal Circuit held in Chew v. California3 1 that the Eleventh
32
Amendment provides states with immunity from patent infringement lawsuits.
The court explained that in order for a state to be subject to a patent infringement
lawsuit, Congress must amend the statute, clearly and unmistakably expressing
its intention to abrogate state immunity. 33 Two years later, Congress responded
to Chew by passing the Patent Reform Act,34 which expressly abrogated state
immunity from patent infringement lawsuits. 35 Congress claimed it had

28. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
29. See generally Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S.
627, 647 (1999) (rejecting Congress's attempt to make "all States immediately amenable to suit in
federal court for all kinds of possible patent infringement").
30. See Staci R. DeRegnaucourt, Comment, Anything You Can Do, I Can Do Better and
Without Consequences: The Public University Monopoly on Research Technologies and the
EducationalMarket, 2010 MICH. ST. L. REv. 471, 489-90.
31. 893 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
32. Id. at 336.
33. Id. at 334 (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 230 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985)).
34. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.), invalidated by Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
35. 35 U.S.C. § 296(a) (1992), invalidatedby Fla. Prepaid,527 U.S. 627. The Act stated:
As used in this section, the term "whoever" includes any State, any instrumentality of a
State, and any officer or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his
official capacity. Any State, and any such instrumentality, officer, or employee, shall be
subject to the provisions of this title in the same manner and to the same extent as any
nongovernmental entity.
§ 271(h). The Act further stated:
Any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or employee of a State or
instrumentality of a State acting in his official capacity, shall not be immune, under the
eleventh amendment of the Constitution of the United States or under any other doctrine
of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal court by any person, including any
governmental or nongovernmental entity, for infringement of a patent under section 271,
or for any other violation under this title.
§ 296(a).
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authority to abrogate immunity with respect to patent infringement under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 36
In 1999, the Supreme Court invalidated the Patent Reform Act in Florida
Prepaid, holding that the legislation was an unconstitutional attempt by
Congress to exercise its Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Power. 3' In
Florida Prepaid,a patentee sued a Florida state agency for allegedly infringing
its patented apparatus and method for administering a college investment
program. 38 The Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals'
decision to allow the lawsuit because Florida's state immunity had been
abrogated under the Act. 39 The Court reasoned that, although Congress has the
power under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause to abrogate state
immunity, Congress could only invoke this power by showing that the states
exhibited a pattern of patent infringement and that there were no other suitable
remedies-a showing Congress failed to make. 40 After FloridaPrepaid,the law
regarding state immunity from patent infringement lawsuits is clear: absent
proper congressional abrogation,
sovereign immunity can be circumvented
only
if
the
state
consents
to
suit
in
federal
court.4342 However, federal case law
sets a very high bar for establishing such consent.
B. State Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

A state may consent to a lawsuit in federal court through express or
constructive waiver of its sovereign immunity, but it must be clear that the state

36. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 635-36. Congress also claimed authority to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the Patent Clause) and art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (the Interstate
Commerce Clause) of the Constitution, however the Court disagreed, stating that "Seminole Tribe
makes clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I
powers .
I..."
Id. (citing Seminole Tribe v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996)).
37. See id. at 633-34.
38. Id. at 630-31.
39. Id. at 630, 633-34.
40. See id. at 640.
41. In 2003, Congress's latest statutory attempt to abrogate state immunity from patent
infringement lawsuits, the Intellectual Property ProtectionRestoration Act, failed to make it out of
subcommittee. See Bruce E. O'Connor & Emily C. Peyser, Ex Parte Young: A Mechanism for
Enforcing FederalIntellectual PropertyRights Against States, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 225, 230
(2004). This Act would have required states to voluntarily and permanently waive state immunity
to patent infringement lawsuits as a condition to enforcing their patents in federal court. See
Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2003, H.R. 2344, 108th Cong. § 3 (1st Sess.
2003). No further legislation relating to abrogation of state immunity has since been introduced.
See Leah Chan Grinvald, Making Much Ado About Theory: The Chinese Trademark Law, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 53, 80 n.142 (2008) (citing H.R. 2344).
42. Coll. Sav. Bank. v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 131 F.3d 353, 356
(3d Cir. 1997), aff'd, 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
43. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675
(1999) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)).
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has submitted itself to federal jurisdiction. 44 Examples of clear submission to
federal jurisdiction include: cases where a state voluntarily removes a case to
federal court,45 cases that are a part of one continuous action in which the state
previously waived its immunity,4 cases where a state enacts legislation waiving
its sovereign immunity, 47 and cases where the state enters into a contract with a
provision waiving immunity. 48 Additionally, in certain situations, a court49may
infer from the state's actions that it has constructively waived its immunity.
In Biomedical Patent Management Corp. v. California, Department of

Health Services,50 the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals set a high bar for what
constitutes a constructive waiver of immunity, and noted that any waiver does
not extend to subsequently filed actions, even if they involve the same parties
and the same subject matter. 51 In that case, the Biomedical Patent Management
Corporation (BPMC) sued the California Department of Health Services (DHS)
for infringing its patented method for screening birth defects in pregnant
women. 52 When DHS claimed immunity, BPMC argued that by filing for
declaratory judgment in a prior related lawsuit DHS had constructively waived
its immunity. 53 According to the court, by voluntarily appearing and filing for a
declaratory judgment in the prior lawsuit, DHS submitted itself to the federal
court's jurisdiction-an act constituting waiver of Eleventh Amendment

44. See id. at 675-76 (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944); Gunter
v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)).
45. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002)
(noting that Congress would not have intended to create the unfair situation in which a State both
submits itself to federal jurisdiction and asserts sovereign immunity in the same case).
46. See, e.g., City of S. Pasadena v. Mineta, 284 F.3d 1154, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting
that a state's waiver of immunity "only helps plaintiffs if it carries over to the current lawsuit," and
that if it does not, then any waiver expires).
47. Christopher Cowan, Note, An Unworkable Rule of Law: The ADA, Education, and
Sovereign Immunity; An Argument for Overruling Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida Consistent
with Stare Decisis, 80 S. CAL. L. REv. 347, 370 (2007).
48. See David G. Ebner, Smaller Exploration Companies on the International Frontier,37
NAT. RESOURCES J. 707, 724 (1997).
49. See, e.g., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 675-76 (1999) (citing Gunter v. Atl. Coast Line R.R. Co., 200 U.S. 273, 284 (1906)) (stating
that waiver occurs "if the State voluntarily invokes our jurisdiction"). In Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356 (2006), the Supreme Court concluded that Congress
implicitly waived sovereign immunity as it related to the laws of bankruptcy. Id.at 377, 379. For a
colorful argument that the Katz abrogation of immunity related to bankruptcy should be extended to
the Patent Act, see James F. Caputo, Note, Copy-Katz: Sovereign Immunity, the Intellectual
Property Clause, and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, 95 GEO. L.J. 1911, 1930-40
(2007). But see Nat'l Ass'n of Bds. of Pharmacy v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 633 F.3d
1297, 1313-14 (11 th Cir. 2011) (declining to extend implicit waiver of immunity to the Copyright
Act and noting that "[t]he holding in Katz is carefully circumscribed to the bankruptcy context").
50. 505 F.3d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
51. Id.at 1339.
52. Id.at 1331.
53. Id.at 1334.
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immunity. 54 However, the court made clear that any waiver of immunity is only
temporary; if the court dismisses the action or a new action is filed, waiver in the
5
initial lawsuit is extinguished. 55
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of the University of Missouri, the Federal
Circuit held that the University of Missouri waived its immunity by initiating
and participating in an interference proceeding before the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences (BPAI).57 In that case, the university invoked an
interference proceeding before the BPAI and successfully established
inventorship; however, when Vas-Cath appealed the decision to the Federal
Circuit, the university claimed it was immune from lawsuit in federal court.5 8
The court distinguished mere participation in the federal patent system from the
"litigation-type" proceeding before the BPAI: a university does not waive its
immunity through the routine prosecution of a patent before the Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), but waiver could be implied when a university invokes
a hostile, adversarial proceeding before the BPAI similar to a declaratory
judgment action in federal court.5" The court would not allow the university to
invoke such a proceeding, obtain a favorable ruling, and then claim immunity
when the losing party appealed to the Federal Circuit. Allowing the university
in the state's "selective use
to invoke sovereign immunity on appeal would result
6
of 'immunity' to achieve litigation advantages." '
In summary, absent express or implied consent, a state university may not be
sued for patent infringement. Because obtaining a university's express consent
is unlikely, a patentee would likely rely on a theory of constructive waiver in any
patent infringement lawsuit. Routine use of federal patent law does not
constitute a general waiver of state immunity, but waiver may be implied with
respect to counterclaims when a university has initiated litigation-style
proceedings, filed for a declaratory judgment, or requested an interference
proceeding before the BPAI. However, consent is given on a proceeding-byproceeding basis; therefore, the immunity is restored once the proceeding or
lawsuit is over.

54. Id. at 1333 (citing Regents of Univ. of N.M. v. Knight, 321 F.3d 1111, 1124 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
55. See id.at 1339.
56. 473 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
57. Id. at 1378.
58. Id. at 1380-81.
59. See id. at 1383 (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).
60. Id. at 1385; see also Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Phx. Int'l Software, Inc., 653
F.3d 448, 467 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing In re Friendship Med. Ctr., Ltd., 710 F.2d 1297, 1301 (7th Cir.
1983)) (holding that waiver of immunity is limited to the same transaction or occurrence, such that
waiver only extends to compulsory, not permissive, counterclaims).
61. Vas-Cath, 473 F.3d at 1383 (quoting Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535
U.S. 613, 620 (2002)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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C. A Limited Exception to Immunity: The Ex parte Young Doctrine
Although the Eleventh Amendment is likely to bar a patent infringement
lawsuit against a state university, patent owners may obtain equitable relief by
suing a state official under the doctrine of Ex parte Young. In general, lawsuits
against state officials in their official capacity are considered suits against the
state itself; 62 however, under Ex parte Young, actions in violation of federal law
remove state officials from their official capacity and place them outside the
scope of sovereign immunity. 63 In order to successfully invoke the doctrine, the
plaintiff must establish an ongoing or prospective violation of federal law, and
the remedy is limited to injunctive relief. 6F The plaintiff must also establish an
between the state official and the alleged violation of
adequate connection
66
federal law.
In Pennington Seed, the Federal Circuit held that in order to invoke the Ex
parte Young doctrine, the patentee must show a causal connection between the
67
official charged and the act of infringement. In this case, after a lawsuit against
the University of Arkansas was dismissed by the district court on grounds of
sovereign immunity, 68 the plaintiff amended the complaint to name four
university officials: the chairman of the board for the university system, the
a professor. 69
president of the university, the chancellor of the university, and
The district court once again dismissed the case.70 On appeal, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court, finding that the plaintiff failed to allege any
causal connection between the university officials and the alleged infringement,
since the plaintiff merely argued that they supervised intellectual property
activity and were capable of stopping the ongoing violation of federal patent
law. 71 The court held that the alleged causal connection between the university
officials and the patent infringement insufficient because the nexus between the

62. See Gary R. Rom, RLUIPA and Prisoner'sRights: Vindicating Liberty of Consciencefor
the Condemned by Targeting a State's Bottom Line, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 283, 300 (2009).
63. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
64. Pennington Seed, Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, 457 F.3d 1334, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(citing Frew v. Hawkins, 540 U.S. 431, 437 (2004); Verizon Md., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 535
U.S. 635, 645 (2002)).
65. Id. at 1341 (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102-03
(1984)).
66. Id. at 1342 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 157).
67. Id. at 1342-43.
68. Id. at 1337 (citing Pennington Seed Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, No. 04-4194-CV
CSOW, 2004 WL 5180533, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 29, 2004) (dismissing all claims against the
university because "the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiffs' state law conversion claim")).
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing Pennington Seed Inc. v. Produce Exch. No. 299, No. 04-4194-CV-C-SOW,
2005 WL 1312940, at *3, *4 (W.D. Mo. June 1, 2005) (dismissing claims based on Eleventh
Amendment immunity and lack of personal jurisdiction in the district court)).
71. Id. at 1342-43 (citing Plaintiff's Suggestions in Opposition to University Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss at 7, Pennington Seed, 2005 WL 1312940 (No. 04-4194-CV-C-SOW)
[hereinafter Plaintiffs Suggestions]).
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patent infringement and the accused infringer requires more than an obligation to
prevent a violation, it requires that the accused individual actually violated a
federal law. 72 The court reasoned that absent a causal connection between the
university officials and the infringement, the suit was essentially one against the
official as a representative of the state, and the state was thereby incorporated as
a party to the suit in violation of the Eleventh Amendment.73 In addition, the
Supreme Court has refused to allow artful pleading to circumvent the protection
of the state, underscoring its view of the Eleventh Amendment as a real limit on
federal jurisdiction.74
In sum, to invoke the doctrine of Ex parte Young, patent owners who seek a
remedy for the unauthorized use of their patented invention by a state university
must show a current or prospective infringement, as well as meet the Federal
Circuit's standard of a sufficient nexus between the state official and the alleged
violation of federal law. The Federal Circuit seems hesitant to find a sufficient
allegation of the required nexus and will not allow artful pleading to help
establish that nexus. Moreover, even if a patent owner is successful, a university
will not be liable for monetary damages or past violations of federal patent law,
but may only be enjoined from any future infringement. Considering the heavy
burden of proof required for relief under Ex parte Young, the limited remedy a
patent owner would receive in the rare case of success, and the high costs of
litigation, relief under this doctrine is an insufficient alternative to lawsuits for
patent infringement in federal court.
D. The Scope of the Problem and the Needfor a Solution
Some commentators consider the impact of problematic state immunity from
patent infringement lawsuits so limited that the problem does not merit efforts at
correction.75 Indeed, in Florida Prepaid, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that
there were only eight patent infringement lawsuits against states in the 1 10-year
period leading up to that case. 76 However, a later government study showed that
the caseload is more pervasive than initially thought-finding fifty-eight patent

72. Id.; but see Salerno v. City Univ. of N.Y., 191 F. Supp. 2d 352, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(holding that the Ex parte Young doctrine was properly asserted in a copyright infringement action
against a university chancellor and university director who were responsible for the administration
and implementation of copyright policies).
73. Pennington Seed, 457 F.3d at 1342-43.
74. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997).
75. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who's Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The
Limited Impact of the Court's Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 217 (2006)
("[T]he criticism of the Court's sovereign immunity cases is considerably exaggerated."); but see
Narechania, supra note 6, at 1576 (explaining that, while states may not use patents for litigation
advantages, empirical evidence shows that states "may use their immunity to become aggressive
patent licensors").
76. See Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 640
(1999).
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infringement lawsuits in which the state was a defendant in a sixteen year period
beginning in 1985. 77 In addition, a small caseload does not mean that there is no
need for a solution, because a low number of cases can be attributed to a variety
of other issues. 78 Litigation is expensive and preferably avoided, 79 however, the

secondary effects of state immunity are not limited to the courtroom. These
effects are likely also present in licensing deals, in which universities have a
strong upper hand in negotiations because they know that if the terms of the deal
do not suit them they have precedential authority to infringe the patent with
impunity. Indeed, some scholars in the intellectual property community claim
that the low caseload is due to the fact that states previously thought they were
not immune from patent infringement suits in federal court and, consequently,
would more often settle, but Florida Prepaid revealed the falsity of that
impression. 81 The parties' inequality in bargaining power obliterates the concept
of arms length bargaining in favor of the conception of contracts of adhesion.
That is so even though universities may be less vicious in their licensing
practices than they could be under their broad Eleventh Amendment protection.
Furthermore, for every lawsuit filed against a state, it is possible that a handful of
patent owners with similar meritorious claims chose not to pursue a lawsuit
because the time, money, and effort of proving infringement while avoiding the
82
immunity issue would be prohibitive when compared to any potential reward.
Likewise, those lawsuits that are brought against a state, with the expectation
83whof
a long uphill battle, are likely of extreme importance to the patent owner, who
should not be denied a fair chance at arguing an infringement case due to the
small overall caseload.
In addition, due to the increasing effects of university technology transfer
offices and the general increase in intellectual property licensing, 84 the problem
of state immunity from patent infringement may already be-or soon might
beome-more pervasive than the case statistics indicate. The extent of the
relationship between state universities and federal patent law is evident from the
PTO's recent mobilization of satellite patent offices: Congress authorized the
creation of three satellite offices of the PTO as part of the America Invents Act

77. GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 2.
78. See Eric B. Cheng, Note, Alternatives to District Court Patent Litigation: Reform by
Enhancing the Existing Administrative Options, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 1135, 1151 (2010) ("[P]atent
litigation in the United States can be extraordinarily expensive and uncertain.").
79. See id.
80. See Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1161, 1166-67 & n.14 (2000) ("[1]t's possible that Florida Prepaid will embolden state
governments to infringe patents much more often.").
81. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 24.
82. See Cheng, supranote 78, at 1151.
83. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
84. See Kristen Osenga, Rembrandts in the Research Lab: Why UniversitiesShould Take a
Lesson from Big Business to Increase Innovation, 59 ME. L. REV. 407, 426 (2007) (citing KEVIN G.
RIVETTE & DAVID KLINE, REMBRANDTS IN THE ATTIC: UNLOCKING THE HIDDEN VALUE OF
PATENTS 12-13 (2000)) ("Intellectual property licensing in academia has been skyrocketing.").
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of 2011.85 The Director of the PTO, David Kappos,-who makes the final
decision on new office locations---emphasized the presence of universities as a
primary objective measure related to site selection.q6 Even if the problem has
not come to a head since 1999, the imbalance of rights between private patent
holders and the states needs to be corrected.
III. RECOURSE IN THE STATE COURTS
At the federal level, patent owners have insufficient opportunities for redress
when a state university infringes their patents: Congress failed to successfully
abrogate state sovereign immunity, it is difficult to prove the constructive waiver
of a state's immunity, and the Ex parte Young doctrine requires a high burden of
proof and provides only injunctive relief.87 As an alternative to suit in federal
court, patent owners can try to obtain a remedy in state court using a state law
cause of action, 88 but they will experience several obstacles.
First, most state constitutions or state laws provide state agencies with
immunity in state tribunals-the same problem the patent owner was likely
trying to avoid by bringing an action in state, rather than federal court. 89 Second,
it is unlikely that any state law will provide a cause of action for unauthorized
use of a patented invention; states have never needed such a law because patent
laws are enacted by Congress and are enforced by the PTO.9° Therefore, patent
owners would have to find an alternative cause of action. Finally, if such a law
did exist, federal patent law would preempt it anyway--Congress granted
original jurisdiction over patent disputes to the federal district courts91-and
federal patent law will preempt any state law that either looks like a patent
infringement lawsuit or provides a similar remedy. 92 Therefore, a patent owner
might have difficulty 93fitting a patent infringement action within any available
state causes of action.
One conflict a patent owner will likely encounter when seeking redress in
state court for the unauthorized use of an invention is federal preemption. Courts
have consistently held that federal patent law preempts any state cause of action
that attempts to provide "patent-like protection."9 This creates a dilemma for

85. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 23, 125 Stat. 336 (2011).
86. See Brooks Boliek, Patent Satellite Offices Sought by Politicians, POLITIcO (Oct. 11,
2011, 11:40 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/11 /65687.html.
87. See supra Part II.
88. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 14.
89. Id. at 23. See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-78-20 (2005) (governing state immunity in
South Carolina).
90. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 18-21.
91. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2006).
92. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 17-18.
93. See id. at 18-20.
94. E.g., Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir.
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("[Federal] law preempts state law that offers 'patent-like
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patent owners who attempt to hold a university accountable in state court-they
must find a way to distinguish their state action from an attempt to circumvent
Eleventh Amendment immunity by bringing a patent infringement suit in a state
court. 95 Although the patent owner may try to conceal its true intent-for
example, by labeling the unauthorized use as a trespass to chattels-the
preemption inquiry focuses on the conduct underlying the claim,96 so attempts to
artfully plead patent infringement in state court will likely fail.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that Congress, by providing limited
monopoly rights for patentable inventions and relegating all other designs to the
public domain, attempted to balance two competing interests-incentivizing
creation and fostering free competition. 97 Any state law that affects the scope of
patent law risks upsetting this balance, and is therefore prohibited. 98 Just as a
state court could not adjust the rights granted to a patent owner under federal
patent law without violating the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, 99 it may
not use its own state law to provide protection that is contrary to the objectives
of federal patent law. 'oo
Several alternative remedies may be available to private patent owners when
a patent infringement lawsuit in federal court is not an option. Although they
vary from state to state, some common alternative causes of action include:
trespass to chattels, conversion, contract, unjust enrichment, and unfair
competition.1°1 These alternative state remedies and their likelihood of success
are discussed below.
A.

Trespass to Chattels or Conversion

The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) acts as a limited waiver of the federal
government's sovereign immunity, thus exposing it to limited liability for the
torts of its employees. 1°2 Most states have enacted similar legislation, allowing
private individuals to recover for injuries sustained by a tortious act of the

protection' to discoveries unprotected under federal patent law." (quoting Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156 (1989))).
95. See Veto Pro Pac, LLC v. Custom Leathercraft Mfg. Co., No. 3:08-cv-00302 (VCB),
2009 WL 276369, at *2 (D. Conn. Feb. 5, 2009) (holding that claims filed in state court that simply
incorporate by reference a claim of patent infringement are preempted).
96. Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d 1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998),
overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed.
Cir. 1999).
97. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964).
98. Id. at 231 (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.
2).
99. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
100. Sears, 376 U.S. at 231.
101. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 19-20; see also Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford
Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (holding that plaintiff's alleged claim of unjust
enrichment was preempted).
102. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (2006).
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state. 0 3 Therefore, patent owners seeking redress in state court for unauthorized
use of their inventions may try to establish trespass to chattels or conversionstate causes of action similar to a patent infringement lawsuit.'14
Someone "who dispossesses another of a chattel. . . is liab[le] in trespass for
the damage done" to the chattel or "for the loss of the value of its use."' 0' If the
dispossession is a serious interference with the owner's right to control the
chattel, the dispossession might rise to the level of conversion. '0 Conversion
and trespass to chattels are both based on the interference with possession of
property, differing only in the seriousness of the interference and the available
as. a patent
owner's
remedies. 1°7 Chattels
. . .. include personal property,
. such
.
08
Therefore,
intangible right to exclude others from using its inventions.
ignoring jurisdiction concerns and assuming the action is not preempted by
federal law, a state court might view unauthorized use of a patented invention as
a serious interference with the patent owner's right to exclude, thus constituting
a conversion.
Although a claim for tortious conversion of patent rights might not be
subject to a sovereign immunity defense under the state or federal tort claims
acts, such a claim may be dismissed on the grounds that it is preempted due to
conflict with federal patent law.1°9 A conversion claim would necessarily focus
on the university's use of a patented invention in violation of the patent owner's
right to exclude; therefore, because the tort claim is based on conduct that is
governed by federal patent law, it is preempted."'
B.

Unjust Enrichment

Unjust enrichment is the retention of a benefit to the detriment of another
without an offer of the compensation that is reasonably expected under the
circumstances."' In the absence of an enforceable agreement between the

103. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 895C cmt. f (1979); e.g., S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 15-78-20 (2005) (governing state immunity in South Carolina).
104. See GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 19-20 & n.22.
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 222 & cmt. a (1965).

106. Id. § 222.
107. Id. §§ 222 & cmt. a, 222A & cmt. c.
108. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 268 (9th ed. 2009).

109. See Auburn Univ. v. Int'l Bus. Machs. Corp., No. 3:09cv694-WHA, 2009 WL 3757049,
at *3 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 9, 2009) (citing Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. Harmonic Design, Inc., 153 F.3d
1318, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan
Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
110. Id. (citing Hunter Douglas, 153 F.3d at 1335); see also Miracle Boot Puller Co. v.
Plastray Corp., 269 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1978) (citing 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 6
(2003)) (holding that conversion of patent rights is wrong under federal patent law only because
there is no common law right of patent owners' to exclude others from copying and using their
inventions); but see Jacobs Wind Elec. Co., Inc. v. Dep't of Transp., 626 So. 2d 1333, 1334-35,
1337 (Fla. 1993) (holding that a conversion claim was not preempted by federal patent law).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1678 (9th ed. 2009).
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university and the patent owner, this quasi-contractual method of recovery, based
recovery.112
upon equitable principles, has been proposed as a viable method for
However, there is some debate about whether an unjust enrichment claim is
preempted by federal patent law. 113 An unjust enrichment claim asserted by a
private party against a state university for the use of a patented invention is
clearly a patent-like state remedy where a federal remedy would not exist. This
remedy, if allowed, would effectively circumvent congressional efforts involved
in the fine line drawing of the Patent Act. 1 4 However, a claim of unjust
enrichment may be allowed when its real purpose is to compensate for the
wrongful misappropriation or disclosure of privileged information and it is not a
covert attempt to enforce patent rights." 5
Assuming that a claim of unjust enrichment is not preempted, a successful
plaintiff must establish a benefit to the defendant resulting from detriment to the
plaintiff and that "equity and good conscience require restitution." 116 Showing
the correlation between the benefit to an infringing university and the detriment
to the patent owner is straightforward, a court need only look at the potential
licensing revenue. Establishing that equity and good conscience require the
patent owner to receive some compensation may be more difficult. The court
whether forced
will have broad discretion to consider all factors and determine
17
compensation or an injunction is the most appropriate remedy."
An advantage of the unjust enrichment cause of action is that the plaintiff
need not show a wrongful act, but only an injury and unjust benefit; therefore,
the focus will be less on the action of the university-which state courts may be
reluctant to scrutinize-and more on the injury to the private patent owner.
However, courts are reluctant to impose liability in any action where the state
treasury might be implicated in a recovery;" l 9 therefore, the infringing university
will not be completely overlooked. Given the long history of university use of

112. See Robert A. Cohen, Patent Infringement and the Eleventh Amendment: Can the
Sovereign Be Held Accountable?, 49 IDEA 85, 118 (2008).
113. See Ultra-Precision Mfg., Ltd. v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.3d 1369, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(affirming a district court ruling that federal patent law preempted a state claim for unjust
enrichment because it offered patent-like protection to discoveries in the public domain); but see
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1974) (holding that a claim for violation
of Ohio trade secret law did not sufficiently conflict with federal patent law and therefore was not
preempted after examining the objectives of patent and trade secret law).
114. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156-57 (1989).
115. See Univ. of Colo. Found., Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 342 F.3d 1298, 1306-07 (Fed. Cir.
2003) (citations omitted) (distinguishing between an unjust enrichment claim that is based on the
enforcement of property rights versus the wrongful use of misappropriated information).
116. Beth Isr. Med. Ctr. v. Horizon Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc., 448 F.3d 573, 586
(2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Kaye v. Grossman, 202 F.3d 611, 616 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
117. See Orit Fischman Afori, Flexible Remedies as a Means to Counteract Failures in
CopyrightLaw, 29 CARDOzO ARTS &ENT. L.J. 1, 4 (2011).
118. Beth Isr., 448 F.3d at 586.
119. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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patented inventions, the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Florida Prepaid,
and the relationship between the state and university, a finding of unjust
enrichment is unlikely.
C. Unfair Competition or Interference with Prospective Contractual
Relations

Unfair competition, a cause of action intended to prevent dishonest dealings,
is another potential remedy available in state courts; it essentially prevents one
party from passing off its own goods as those of another.120 This cause of action
has received mixed success in courts when patents are involved, as courts are
hesitant to allow the cause of action when doing so might upset the balance
created by Congress in the federal patent laws or provide protection over designs
in the public domain. 121 When a university uses a patented invention without
authorization, it is typically not in a commercial context where a court would
find that it is trying to pass off its goods as those of another party; 122 therefore,
even if this cause of action is not preempted, the patent owner will have
difficulties establishing a prima facie case of unfair competition in court.
An alternative but related cause of action is interference with prospective
contractual relations. A prima facie case of intentional interference with
prospective contractual relations requires a plaintiff to establish that an injury
resulted from an intentional interference that was improper in either method or
purpose. 123 However, if a claim for tortious interference with contractual
relations is based on the same conduct that allegedly violated the patent laws, i.e.
infringement, that claim is preempted. 124
IV.

THE TAKINGS CLAUSE

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides that the federal
government may not take private property for public use unless it pays just
compensation. 125 This clause limits the government's power of eminent domain

120. See 87 C.J.S. Trade-Marks, etc. §§ 24, 26 (2010).
121. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. Exxon Corp., 139 F.3d 1470, 1475 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
that the state law cause of action for unfair competition did not interfere with the enforcement of
patent laws); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964) (finding that a
cause of action for unfair competition was preempted because it altered the balance of interests in
the federal patent laws).
122. See DUKE UNiv., FACULTY

HANDBOOK: POLICY ON INVENTIONS, PATENTS, AND

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER P-7 (2008), available at http://olv.duke.edu/Inventors/PoliciesAnd
Procedures/policy-on-inventions.pdf.
123. Eldeco, Inc. v. Charleston Cnty. Sch. Dist., 372 S.C. 470, 480, 642 S.E.2d 726, 731
(2007) (citing Crandall Corp. v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 302 S.C. 265, 266, 395 S.E.2d 179,

180 (1990)).
124. Cardiovention, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 430 F. Supp. 2d 933, 939 (D. Minn. 2006).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.").
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and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process

Clause. 16 In addition, nearly all of the states have express provisions similar to
the Takings Clause in their state constitutions.127 However, the Takings Clause
and federal courts is nearly the same, regardless of the
analysis used in the state 28
source of governing law. 1
The government exercises its power of eminent domain by bringing a
condemnation action: a proceeding where the government admits to taking
private property, leaving the court only to determine the amount of just
compensation.129 When a private property owner believes that the government
has violated the Takings Clause by seizing property without bringinf a
condemnation action, that party may bring an inverse condemnation action.
In
an inverse condemnation proceeding, the government has not admitted to taking
private property, so the court must first determine if there was in fact a
government taking.'13 The amount of just compensation is a secondary issue
only addressed if a taking occurred. 132 To be successful in a patent infringement

context, a patent owner would need to show that the unauthorized use of its
patented invention by the state or federal government constitutes a taking of its
personal property-the intangible right to exclude others.' 33 If the patent owner

can successfully establish such a taking, the Takings Clause requires the
government to pay just compensation.
In determining whether a taking has occurred, the court must answer three
central questions: what constitutes "private property," when is property "taken,"
and what is "public use"?134 If the court finds that a taking has occurred, it must

126. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 536 (2005).
127. See Robert Meltz, Takings Law Today: A Primerfor the Perplexed, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q.
307, 311 (2007); e.g., S.C. CONST. art. I, § 13 ("Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution,
private property shall not be taken for private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public
use without just compensation being first made for the property.").
128. See Meltz, supra note 127, at 311-12; e.g., Byrd v. City of Hartsville, 365 S.C. 650, 656
n.6, 620 S.E.2d 76, 79 n.6 (2005) (citing Westside Quik Shop, Inc. v. Stewart, 341 S.C. 297, 306,
534 S.E.2d 270, 275 (2000), overruled by Byrd, 365 S.C. 650, 620 S.E.2d 76) ("Takings analysis
under South Carolina law is the same as the analysis under federal law.").
The South Carolina Supreme Court has adopted the most broad view of what constitutes a
taking; the analysis is bound only by the limits of the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. See Kline v. City of Columbia, 249 S.C. 532, 537, 155 S.E.2d 597, 599 (1967) (citing
Webb v. Greenwood Cnty., 229 S.C. 267, 278,92 S.E.2d 688, 692 (1956)).
129. See Meltz, supra note 127, at 310.
130. See id. (citing United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980)).
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See, e.g., Christopher S. Storm, Federal PatentTakings, 2 J. Bus. ENTREPRENEURSIIP &
L. 1, 28-29 (2008) (citations omitted) (demonstrating how a government regulation that eliminates
a patent owner's right to exclude can destroy all economic value in a patent, thus constituting a
regulatory taking).
134. See id. ("[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
(emphasis added)).
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award just compensation' 35-usually the amount of money required to return the
injured property owner
to the position that the owner would have been in had no
36
taking occurred. 1
A. Scope of Private PropertyProtected Under the Fifth Amendment
The scope of property protected by the Fifth Amendment is broad, including
property that is real or personal, tangible or intangible.1 37 In general, Congress
and most legal scholars consider patents to be personal private property and,
therefore, protected under the Fifth Amendment. 38 Indeed, patents have long
been considered property protected against both individual and governmental
appropriation.139 Although this interpretation is not without debate, 14° for the
purposes of this Note, it is assumed that patents are personal property subject to
protection under the Takings Clause.
B. What Constitutes a "Taking "for the Purposes of the Fifth Amendment?
Takings are generally broken down into two categories: physical takings and
regulatory takings.
The "paradigmatic" takings case arises when the

135. See id.; see also Storm, supra note 133, at 25.
136. See Storm, supra note 133, at 25 (citing JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS
PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERNMENTAL POWERS § 17.03[A], at 17-9 (2012)). While the
issue of just compensation is beyond the scope of this Note, for a good summary of compensation in
takings cases, see id. at 25-26.
137. Huntleigh USA Corp. v. United States, 525 F.3d 1370, 1377-78 (Fed. Cir. 2008); see
also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that trade secret
property rights provided under state law are protected by the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment); Maritrans Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 1344, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting the
argument that personal property is not subject to Fifth Amendment protection); S.C. State Highway
Dep't v. Smith, 253 S.C. 639, 641, 172 S.E.2d 827, 828 (1970) (citations omitted) (holding that
personal property is property for Takings Clause purposes under South Carolina state law).
138. See 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2006) ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of private property.");
e.g., Joshua I. Miller, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) and the UnconstitutionalTaking of Patents, 13 YALE J.L.
& TECH. 1, 7-18 (2011) (citations omitted) (demonstrating that patents are property under the Fifth
Amendment through an examination of the Patent Act and case law).
139. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 415 (1945), supplemented, 324 U.S.
570 (1945) (citing United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 189 (1933); William
Cramp & Sons Ship & Engine Bldg. Co. v. Int'l Curtis Marine Co., 246 U.S. 28, 39-40 (1918);
Hollister v. Benedict & Burnham Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885); James v. Campbell, 104 U.S.
356, 357-58 (1881)).
140. See Zoltek Corp. v. United States, 442 F.3d 1345, 1352-53 & n.3 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
opinion vacated on reh'g en banc, No. 2009-5135, 2012 WL 833892 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 14, 2012)
(citing Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04) (holding that patents are not property for purposes of the
Fifth Amendment and distinguishing them from trade secrets); but see, e.g., Miller, supra note 138,
at 20-21; Adam Mossoff, Patents as ConstitutionalPrivate Property: The HistoricalProtection of
Patents Under the Takings Clause, 87 B.U. L. REV. 689,712-24 (2007); Storm, supra note 133, at 2
(providing an academic criticism of Zoltek).
141. Storm, supra note 133, at 13.
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government asserts its power of eminent domain to seize real private property for
public use-an example of a physical, or per se, taking.14 2 When the
government has determined that private property is necessary for a public use
and the owner is unwilling to sell, the government may exercise its power of
eminent domain to seize the property without the owner's consent. 143 The
Takings Clause acts as a limitation on this power, requimng that "just
compensation" be paid to the owner of the seized private property.
While physical takings are relatively straightforward-involving the
physical invasion of land or dispossession of property from its ownerregulatory takings are more loosely defined.1 45 A regulatory taking can occur
when the government imposes a limitation or condition on the use or disposal of
private property, even without dispossessing the owner.146 By regulating the use
or control of private property, the ,overnment has effectively intruded on the
property owner's "bundle of rights," 47 resulting in a loss in value for which the
owner must be compensated. Regulatory takings analysis involves a factintensive, policy-oriented, and flexible approach that weighs all the factors in
each case in order to determine whether the loss in value due to the regulation
"goes too far.,, 148
Regulatory takings fall into two categories: total or partial. 14 A total
regulatory taking occurs when a government regulation completely deprives
private property of all economic value. 50 A successful showing of a total
regulatory taking is very rare, requiring total elimination of property value: a
diminution in value of 95% does not qualify as a total regulatory taking. 151 In

142. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005).
143. See 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 6 (2004) (citations omitted).
144. Sea Cabins v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 345 S.C. 418, 429, 548 S.E.2d 595, 601 (2001)
(quoting and citing U.S. CONST. amend. V; First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. Cnty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 314 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124-25 (1978)
(providing a flexible approach focusing on the economic impact of the regulation on the property
owner, among other factors).
146. See Storm, supra note 133, at 18 (citing RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SUPREME NEGLECT: How
TO REVIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY 97 (2008)); see also Penn
Cent., 438 U.S. at 127-28 (discussing the case of Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922)).
147. See Gary E. Marchant, Property Rights and Benefit-Sharing for DNA Donors?, 45
JURIMETRICS J. 153, 154 n.4 (2005) ("The term 'property rights' generally refers to a 'bundle' of
rights that the owner of property enjoys, including the right to use, control, sell, and exclude others
from the property.").
148. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002) (citing and quoting Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); Pa. Coal
Co., 260 U.S. at 415) (internal quotation marks omitted).
149. Meltz, supra note 127, at 329 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015, 1029; Penn Cent., 438
U.S. at 124).
150. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029.
151. Id. at 1064 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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addition, 52total regulatory takings are likely confined to cases involving real
property.
If a property owner cannot establish the full loss in value required for a total
regulatory taking, the owner may still recover for a partial regulatory taking if
the government's regulation causes a substantial loss in value. 153 Requiring
substantial diminution in value is the court's way of balancing the public and
private interests in the property: if the detriment to the private party does not
meet the substantial diminution threshold, the benefit to the public outweighs the
private injury and there is no taking. 154 In Penn Central, the Supreme Court set
forth a balancing test for determining whether a partial loss in value was
substantial and thus constituting a partial regulatory taking. 155 This test requires
the court to consider the following factors: the regulation's economic impact on
the property owner, the degree of interference with156 investment-backed
expectations, and the character of the governmental action.
1. Economic Impact of Taking

Although no single Penn Central factor is necessarily dispositive, the factor
given the most weight is the "magnitude of a regulation's economic impact and
the degree to which it interferes with legitimate property interests." 57 The
magnitude of the economic impact is often measured by the remaining economic
use or the remaining market value, including any factors generally perceived in
commerce to improve the marketability of property. 158 Unless the other factors
weigh heavily in favor of a taking, the loss must be very substantial-the
economic impact must be the equivalent of physical appropriation of land.159
Because Penn Central requires comparing the property's lost value to its
remaining value in determining the magnitude of the economic impact, how the
court defines the unit of property is often outcome determinative.160 For
example, in the patent infringement context, if a court views the property interest
as the intangible right to exclude, infringement by the government would result

152. See id. at 1027-28 (majority opinion) (noting that, in the context of personal property, an
owner should be aware of the possibility of a government regulation rendering the property
economically worthless given the State's pervasive control over commercial dealings); see also
Meltz, supra note 127, at 329.
153. See Meltz, supra note 127, at 329 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
154. See Sea Cabins v. City of N. Myrtle Beach, 345 S.C. 418, 430, 548 S.E.2d 595, 601
(2001) ("If the public benefit outweighs the harm to the landowner, there is no taking and the
government need not pay compensation.").
155. Meltz, supra note 127, at 329 (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
156. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124.
157. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 540 (2005).
158. See Meltz, supra note 127, at 334.
159. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987) (citing
Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of
"Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1192 (1967)).
160. See id. (quoting Michelman, supra note 159, at 1192).
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in the complete loss of the patent owner's right to exclude the government.
Because the value of the patent depends on this right of exclusivity, the value of
the patent is significantly decreased, especially in cases where the market for the
technology is limited to only a few potential licensees.
Alternatively, if a court views the property interest as the patent owner's
right to license an invention, the unauthorized use of that invention by the
government would only result in the loss of one potential license. This view
would leave the patent owner with significant remaining value-the right to
license the invention to others-and would only be considered a loss of potential
licensing fees. The distinction is slight-the government's unauthorized use is
effectively the same as the appropriation of a license-but the court's view could
have a potential effect on its valuation of the economic loss. However,
disaggregation of the patent owner's rights would likely be contrary to the
Supreme Court's1 directive to consider the property as a whole in performing a
takings analysis. 61
2.

Interference with Investment-Backed Expectations

In determining the magnitude of interference with investment-backed
expectations, courts often perform a two-step analysis: first, courts determine
whether there actually was an expectation; second, courts consider the objective
reasonableness of any expectation. 162 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 63 the
Supreme Court concluded that the frustration of statutorily created expectations
would constitute a taking, without even considering the other two Penn Central
factors. 164 The Court also explained that a "unilateral expectation or an abstract
uses that
need" is not reasonable. 165 In addition, courts are more protective of 166
are a primary expectation in terms of use and ownership of the property.
Companies invest a significant portion of their revenue in research and
The
development in order to perform well in competitive markets. 167
advancement of technology is the goal of the patent laws; a goal the government
has sought to encourage by providing the limited period of exclusivity as an
incentive for innovation.'6 8 The ability to "exclude freeriders" is fundamental to

161. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 327
(2002) (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 130-31).
162. Meltz, supra note 127, at 339.
163. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
164. See id.
at 1005, 1011, 1013.
165. Id. at 1005-06 (quoting Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155,
161 (1980)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
166. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 136.
167. A recent study estimated that United States corporations spent approximately 2.8% of the
U.S. gross domestic product on research and development in 2008. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D, OECD (Apr. 27, 2011),
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/rdxp-table-201 1-1-en.
168. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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economic development because it provides an advantage in competitive markets
where exclusive control over the next new invention is invaluable. 69 In general,
inventors invest significant time and money to develop patentable inventions. In
disclosing those inventions to the PTO in exchange for the exclusive right to
make, use, or sell them, the inventors clearly intend to reap the benefits of their
inventions.
When the government uses patented inventions without
authorization, it denies patent owners their right to obtain licensing fees and their
right to exclude. Therefore, a court would likely find that the unauthorized use
of patented inventions significantly interferes with the investment-backed
expectations of the patent owners. These expectations are not unilateral on the
part of the patent owner, but are instead the primary expectations of both the
patent applicant and the governmentl7°-factors weighing strongly in favor of a
taking.
3. Characterof GovernmentalAction
Takings law is based on "fairness and justice"-the idea that the cost of a
benefit received by all should not be borne by one or a few people. 171 Therefore,
when the government "singles out" a small portion of a similarly situated group
to bear the burden of a government project, a court will likely find that this
action offends fairness and justice and suggests bad faith.' 7 2 A court might also
find bad173faith if the government's action results in significant governmental
benefits.

In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 174 the Supreme Court suggested that the Penn
Central factor concerning the character of the government action should receive
reduced weight in the takings analysis.175 The Court seemed to indicate that the
central focus of the Penn Central inquiry is the 76
impact of the government action
rather than the underlying government purpose. 1
When a university uses a private patent, even for research purposes, it
benefits economically from that use without compensating the inventor. Not
only does the university receive an unjust and uncompensated benefit, but that

169. See Hendler v. United States, 952 F.2d 1364, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1991); cases cited supra
note 4 and accompanying text.
170. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; see also Christopher Gibson, A Look at the Compulsory
License in Investment Arbitration: The Case of Indirect Expropriation, 25 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
357, 396 (2010) (noting that there is an expectation of "relatively strong and permanent protection"
of the invention "during the patent term").

171. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
172. Meltz, supra note 127, at 346.
173. See United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 77-78 (1982).
174. 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
175. See id. at 538-40 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124
(1978)) (noting that while the character of the governmental action "may be relevant" in the takings
analysis, the predominant focus will be on the "magnitude of a regulation's economic impact").

176. See id. at 540.
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benefit is spread among the public at the sole burden of the patent ownerexactly the type of unfairness and unjustness that takings law is meant to
eliminate. 177 This reduces the inventor's future incentive to create and is
contrary to the fundamental objectives of the patent laws.
Finally, a court might look unfavorably upon a state university that uses the
patent laws to obtain and enforce its own intellectual property rights, but then
raises the defense of immunity when the tables are turned. The intent to use the
patent laws to its advantage, but to simultaneously not be bound by them would
likely be viewed as bad faith on the university's part.
It is difficult to meet the burden of showing a partial regulatory taking under
the Penn Central test, 178 but this may be the only feasible option for a patent
owner to assert a successful claim under the Takings Clause. The unauthorized
use of a patented invention is not a physical taking of the patent, but instead is
merely a restriction on the patent owner's intangible right to exclude-a
regulatory taking. 179 Moreover, even if total regulatory takings applied to
personal property, patent owners in that situation have not been totally deprived
of economic value in the patent because they may still license to others.
Therefore, in order to recover under the Takings Clause, a patent owner must
show that a university's unauthorized use constitutes a partial regulatory taking
under the Penn Central test.
C. What Constitutes a "Public Use"?

Absent the owner's consent, the taking of private property for a use that is
not public is unconstitutional and no amount of compensation can cure the
wrong by the government. However, that is often a moot point because a use is
considered public so long as it is "rationally related to a conceivable public
purpose."'18 ° The public does not need to be in actual possession of the property,
but only needs to derive some benefit from the property."' In Kelo v. City of
New London,182 the Supreme Court held that even when private property was
transferred to another private entity, the taking was for a public purpose so lon
as that private entity intended that the future use would benefit the public.

177. See Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
178. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment?: NAFTA's Investment
Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78
N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 62 & n.152 (2003).
179. See David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation Principle in State
Property Law, 77 U. Cmi. L. REV. 97, 115 (2010).
180. Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); see also Meltz, supra note
127, at 326-27 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)) (noting that the trend spanning the
past half century has been for courts to expansively interpret public use to include any taking for a
public purpose).
181. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 244.
182. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
183. See id. at 483-84.
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The Supreme Court does not even consider public use a requirement in
regulatory takings cases. 184 In general, courts have expansively interpreted the
public use requirement such that it will rarely block the government's exercise of
its power of eminent domain. 185
State universities challenged with a takings claim for unauthorized use of a
patented invention would likely have no difficulty meeting the public use prong
of the takings analysis. If the court required a public use, the university could
likely show that the research is intended to benefit the public in general, if not
immediately, then sometime in the future. The university is advancing or
promoting the progress of technology-a goal falling in line with the objectives
of the federal patent laws.1 86 This showing would be sufficient to pass the low
threshold set forth for the public use prong of the takings analysis. Moreover,
because university patent infringement would be categorized as a partial
Court precedent indicates that public use will likely
regulatory taking, Supreme 187
not even be a consideration.
D. Advantages of the Inverse CondemnationApproach

Because the primary purpose of the Eleventh Amendment is to spare states
the indignity of being subject to a foreign judiciary, 188 any theory of recovery
based solely on state common law will likely be immediately suspect to a court
interpreting a doctrine meant to protect ideas of federalism inherent in the
Constitution. However, an action for inverse condemnation is based on the Fifth
Amendment-an amendment aimed at limiting the authority of the government
in cases of overreaching and preventing intrusion upon the sovereign state
entities. In addition, as discussed in Part 1I, Section A, a patent owner whose
invention is used by a state university without authorization could likely
establish a claim for trespass to chattels or conversion in state court, absent
immunity and federal preemption issues. 1 89 Therefore, a claim based on the
Takings Clause, which is the federal equivalent of the tort of trespass, 190 seems
like a reasonable alternative if immunity bars a direct suit for patent infringement
and if a claim for trespass to chattels is preempted.
There is a need for a delicate balance between the goals of Congress in
passing the Patent Act and the protections provided to the states under the
Eleventh Amendment. The regulatory takings analysis allows courts to broadly
and flexibly apply precedent and policy in order to achieve equitable results

184. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 326
(2002).
185. See Meltz, supra note 127, at 326-27 (citing Berman, 348 U.S. 26).
186. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

187.
188.
189.
190.

See supra text accompanying note 184.
See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887).
See supra Part HI.A.
See Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 76, 79, 96 (2005).
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when a state university "goes too far"1 91 in its use of a patented invention. 92
Under the Penn Central test for partial regulatory takings, a court will be able to
look at each case on an individual basis to determine if the benefits to the public
outweigh the rights of the patent owner.' 93 This is perhaps the primary benefit of
the takings analysis: it allows a court to use case-by-case balancing to arrive at
the result that fairness and justice require-likely a compromise somewhere
along a continuum between complete immunity and no immunity. Indeed, a
regulatory takings analysis similar to the one set forth in Penn Central, when
properly applied to patent infringement cases, would seek to achieve a balance
"to promote the common good." 194
A lawsuit based on the Takings Clause is also reasonable because the goals
of the Takings Clause and patent law are aligned. The Takings Clause promotes
the public good by allowing government takings, but requiring the burden to be
spread amongst those benefited-the public. 95
Private property owners
relinquish rights to their property for the public good in exchange for just
compensation paid by the taxpaying public.1
Federal patent laws promote the
public good by advancing science-indeed, that is their purpose as expressed in
the Constitution. 97 However, when a state university uses a patented invention
without authorization, the public is benefited at the sole burden of the patent
owner who loses the right to exclude and receives no compensation. That is the
precise type of situation the Takings Clause was intended to prohibit. 198
For example, if patent owners bear the burden of a state university's
unauthorized use of their patented invention, the lost licensing revenue is
localized among only the patent owners. Alternatively, if the state-funded
university were required to pay just compensation for the use of patented
inventions, the burden would be spread among the taxpayers of that state. This
approach makes sense in light of the goals of the patent laws because innovation
is less likely to be stifled if a university is required to pay a reasonable licensing
fee, versus when patent owners, after investing significant time and money, have
their inventions appropriated by the state, and are subsequently denied recourse.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Eleventh Amendment provides state universities with sovereign
immunity from suit under federal law by virtue of their relationship to the state

191. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
192. See Storm, supra note 133, at 24.
193. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
194. Id.
195. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
196. See Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 934, 944 (2003).
197. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
198. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005) (noting that distribution of
the regulatory burden is a factor to consider in the takings analysis); Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
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sovereign. This protection is founded on principles of federalism and limited
government. Based on a constitutional mandate, Congress created the federal
patent laws to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." 199 Those laws
provide inventors with the incentive to disclose inventive efforts in exchange for
a limited monopoly on an invention. When state universities intrude on that
monopoly, two areas of constitutionally supported jurisprudence clash-one
aimed at protecting the inventor, and the other aimed at ensuring that a state is
not subject to suit in federal court. The conflict must be resolved in a way that
will result in as little violation of each area's fundamental principles as possible.
Patent owners necessarily must seek relief in state courts because all avenues
for relief under federal patent law in the federal courts is effectively precluded by
the Eleventh Amendment and related doctrine. Many state causes of action are
unsuccessful due to federal preemption, state immunity from suit in the state
tribunal, or the lack of a related cause of action. Therefore, an inverse
condemnation proceeding, founded upon constitutional principles, best serves
the delicate balancing between the two doctrines. The flexible test used to
determine if there was a partial regulatory taking allows courts to weigh all
relevant factors on a case-by-case basis in order to properly balance public and
private interests, thereby achieving an outcome consistent with "fairness and
justice, ' 2°° as required by the Fifth Amendment.
Wesley D. Greenwell

199. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 8.
200. Armstrong, 364 U.S. at 49.
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